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With the beginning of the United States’ "war on terrorism," the former Soviet republics 
of Central Asia suddenly became the focus of unprecedented US attention. Of particular 
importance was Tajikistan, a country that shares a long border with Afghanistan. 
Tajikistan, for its part, was a willing partner; siding with the US campaign opened up 
new access to foreign aid, and was strategically useful as well.
Tajikistan has long been Russia’s closest ally in Central Asia, but relations between 
Dushanbe and Moscow have cooled considerably in recent years. This may have made 
a potential alliance with Washington all the more desirable.
Tajikistan clearly has the potential to play a major role in the new Central Asia. It serves 
as a major conduit for foreign aid to Afghanistan. Additionally, Tajikistan has emerged 
from a seemingly intractable civil war with a peace accord of which many Tajiks are 
justifiably proud. On the surface, Tajikistan seems to offer a model of conflict resolution 
and reconciliation. However, beneath this veneer of stability lurks a host of problems 
that could seriously threaten the future stability of Tajikistan in particular and the region 
as a whole.
In the spring of 1992, following nearly two years of increasing political instability, 
Tajikistan erupted into civil war. The Dushanbe government of former communists had 
agreed to a power-sharing deal with the country’s four main opposition groups; (1) 
however, the leaders of the northern province of Leninobod (from which most of the 
country’s communist leadership originated) and their allies in the impoverished southern 
1
province of Kulob had refused to recognize this government. By early fall, the upper 
hand on the field of battle belonged to the so-called Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT), a 
loose coalition of mostly Kulobi and ethnic Uzbek militias. Late in November, the 
country’s Supreme Council met in Khujand, the capital of Leninobod Province 
(Dushanbe was deemed too dangerous), and chose Emomali Rahmonov, a former state 
farm director and the current head of Kulob Province, (2) as chairman. Opposition 
forces in Dushanbe refused to accept the results of the Khujand session; in mid-
December the PFT, reportedly with Uzbek and Russian assistance, stormed the capital.
Following the capture of Dushanbe by the Popular Front, opposition forces withdrew 
eastwards into the foothills of the Pamir Mountains and south across the Tajik-Afghan 
border. The next five years saw sporadic guerilla fighting along the Tajik-Afghan border 
(the patrolling of which was entrusted to Russia’s 201st Motorized Rifle Division, or 
MRD) and in the mountains of central Tajikistan, particularly in the strategic region of 
Tavildara, which straddles the only road linking Dushanbe with the huge (but sparsely 
populated) Mountain Badakhshon Autonomous Province (MBAP). Many Popular Front 
commanders quickly fell to fighting amongst themselves — in one particularly illustrative 
example, the Front’s two main field commanders, Sangak Safarov and Fayzali Saidov, 
apparently killed one another in a shootout in March 1993. Elsewhere in the republic, 
local warlords looted and killed with impunity, and Dushanbe itself was the scene of 
countless assassinations, bombings, hostage-takings and shootouts.
Years of internationally sponsored negotiations eventually led to a peace treaty signed 
in Moscow in 1997 between Rahmonov (since 1994, president of Tajikistan), and Said 
Abdullo Nuri, a longtime religious activist and the head of the United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO). Over the five years of fighting, tens of thousands had perished, while hundreds 
of thousands had become either internally displaced persons or refugees. The deal 
called for a blanket amnesty for former combatants, the repatriation of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, the integration of UTO fighters and field commanders into the 
fledgling Tajik army, and a 30-percent share in government for members of the former 
opposition.
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The official end of the civil war did not spell an end to Tajikistan’s troubles, however. 
First, a number of field commanders on both sides refused to accept the accords. One 
example was Colonel Mahmud Khudoyberdiev, a former commander in the 201st MRD 
whose defection to the Popular Front did much to turn the tide of battle in the Front’s 
favor in 1992. Khudoyberdiev mutinied against Dushanbe a number of times, and was 
finally driven out of Tajikistan in 1997, fleeing across the border into Uzbekistan. In 
1998, he resurfaced, crossing into Khujand from Uzbekistan with armored vehicles and 
hundreds of fighters. After heavy fighting between Khudoyberdiev’s forces and the 
combined forces of Dushanbe and the UTO, the colonel again withdrew to Uzbekistan; 
he is rumored to be there to this day.
Some opposition field commanders likewise refused to recognize the accords and 
continued to wage war, often resorting to assassination and abduction, particularly in 
the Rasht (formerly known as Qarotegin) Valley to the east of Dushanbe, a former 
opposition stronghold. Large-scale "mopping up" operations against these groups 
continued even after the Moscow accords were signed. In January 2002, Tajikistan’s 
interior ministry announced that 80 "guerilla groups" had been "eliminated" in 2001, with 
50 suspected militants killed and 200 arrested. (3)
The largest such operation was conducted in the summer of 2001 in the Lenin and 
Kofarnihon regions east of Dushanbe. Dubbed "Operation Lightning," this venture was 
directed against the former UTO commanders Rahmon Sanginov and Muaqqal 
Mansurov. Sanginov and Mansurov were eventually killed in the operation, which 
involved the use of artillery and attack helicopters, and resulted in civilian casualties. (4) 
On 25 February of this year, a military tribunal in Dushanbe sentenced nine members of 
Sanginov and Muaqqalov’s bands captured during the operation to death by firing 
squad; 72 of the remaining accused received sentences ranging from 18 months to 25 
years, while one was released on the grounds of poor health. (5)
Other former opposition field commanders seem to have sought new allies; Jum’a 
Namangani, an Uzbek militant and military head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
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(6) reportedly joined forces with al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001; he is said to have 
been killed during the US’s Afghan campaign in the fall of that year. Another former 
Islamist commander, known as Mullo Abdullo, was almost captured during a military 
operation against his band in 2000, although he apparently managed to flee to 
Afghanistan and allegedly joined the IMU and the Taliban. He was reported to have 
been captured in the northern Afghan city of Taluqan in February 2002. (7) Operations 
against the remnants of Mullo Abdullo’s group have continued until quite recently; in late 
November 2002, an alleged former associate of Mullo Abdullo was killed by Tajik 
security forces in the hills outside Kofarnihon, 13 miles east of Dushanbe. (8)
Recalcitrant opposition commanders are not the only ones to have felt the heavy hand 
of Dushanbe. Over the years, the Rahmonov regime has been increasingly successful 
in distancing itself from former PFT commanders. Immediately following the capture of 
Dushanbe, much of Tajikistan was controlled by warlords who were only nominally allied 
to the central government, and whose ultimate allegiance was to their own interests. For 
some years, ex-PFT warlords ruled virtual fiefdoms throughout the country (including 
the capital), often engaging in murder, kidnapping, drugs and arms trafficking, and other 
crimes with impunity. Since then, the tide has turned. During the years of the civil war 
itself, a number of prominent field commanders were killed fighting among themselves 
or in uprisings against the Dushanbe government. (9) Since the peace, others have 
been assassinated, such as Safarali Kenjaev, one of the main instigators of the civil war 
and reportedly the founder of the PFT, who was killed by unknown gunmen in 1999. 
Others have been quietly isolated and rotated from positions in the republic’s command 
structures to less influential positions. A number have been arrested and imprisoned on 
various charges. (10) Of all the PFT’s principal field commanders, only a few remain in 
positions of real power, and even their futures are rumored to be uncertain.
Clearly, the end of warlordism in Tajikistan is to be welcomed, as is the neutralization of 
all armed groups, both ex-opposition and "pro-government," engaged in criminal 
activities. Yet there are real risks involved as well. Dushanbe’s heavy-handedness (both 
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in the legal system (11) and on the battlefield) against former friends and foes alike can 
run the risk of sparking further opposition.
A second cause for concern lies with the possible motives of the Rahmonov regime. It 
seems that many of Rahmonov’s actions are aimed more than anything at 
strengthening his own power base. Rahmonov’s party, the People’s Democratic Party of 
Tajikistan (PDPT), is the dominant party in Tajikistan’s parliament, and members of 
Tajikistan’s officially registered opposition parties (12) have accused the PDPT of using 
unfair means to expand its influence at all levels of regional government as well.
Of all the parties, it is perhaps the IRPT that has been most vocal in its protests; the 
IRPT also publishes the only real opposition newspaper in Tajikistan, Najot ("Salvation"). 
In October 2002, Najot published an open letter by Tajikistan’s five registered opposition 
parties to Rahmonov, protesting that their representatives were not being invited to 
cultural events in Tajikistan’s Khatlon province; this privilege was apparently only being 
extended to members of the PDPT. (13) The following month, Said Abdullo Nuri (head 
of the IRPT since 1999) met with Vladimir Sotirov, the head of the United Nations Office 
of Peace-Building in Tajikistan, and outlined some of his concerns regarding the future 
stability of the country. Nuri complained of the sidelining of the IRPT in the recent by-
elections in Kulob; reportedly, only the PDPT and the CPT had been allowed to field 
candidates. (14)
Also of great concern is the reported harassment of opposition politicians by Tajik law-
enforcement officials. On 10 January 2003, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, a leading figure of 
the DPT and a former opposition field commander, was twice detained by the police 
after the arrest of two of his bodyguards; it took the intervention of Rahmonov himself to 
win Iskandarov’s release. (15)
Rahmonov may also be using the US "war on terrorism" to justify increasingly 
authoritarian measures, particularly against Islamist opposition. In the summer of 2002, 
it was revealed that among the detainees at the US "Camp X-Ray" at Guantánamo, 
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Cuba, were three young Tajik men from the northern city of Isfara, a city with a 
reputation for religious activism — and a center of IRPT support. (16) While Nuri has 
denied that the young men were in any way affiliated with the IRPT, (17) Rahmonov 
seized the opportunity, and before long a full-scale propaganda campaign against the 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan was underway. In November, Isfara’s 
prosecutor announced that 63 clergymen (including 9 members of the IRPT) were 
facing charges of violating Tajikistan’s laws on political parties and religious 
organizations. (18)
To be fair, Rahmonov does not have to go far to taint public opinion concerning the 
opposition. In Tajikistan today, the very word "opposition" is fraught with connotations of 
bloodshed and strife. Some of the opposition parties (in particular the DPT) have been 
wracked by internal bickering. And the IRPT may have lost much of its support by 
compromising with the Rahmonov regime in order to achieve peace in 1997. Yet this 
should not necessarily be a source of comfort to the government. As a recent 
International Crisis Group report points out, disillusionment with the IRPT among 
Tajikistan’s devout Muslims may lead to increased support for much more radical 
groups, such as the increasingly influential Hizb ut-Tahrir party. (19)
Rahmonov has repeatedly stated his desire to create a truly democratic society based 
on the rule of law, and has protested against excessively flattering media coverage of 
his person on more than one occasion. Yet there is clearly a massive propaganda 
campaign underfoot in Tajikistan to present Rahmonov as the sole architect and 
guarantor of Tajikistan’s peace. Clearly, Rahmonov’s contributions to bringing a 
considerable degree of stability to Tajikistan must be acknowledged. Yet it is 
questionable to what extent his increasingly authoritarian policies can guarantee the 
current situation’s longevity.
Recently, Rahmonov’s government has suggested amending the constitution, dropping 
its limitation on presidential terms. (20) In a system where the president already rules by 
virtual decree, this would eliminate almost all checks on Rahmonov’s power. The 
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proposal has been roundly denounced by Tajikistan’s opposition, both within the country 
and without. (21)
Rahmonov’s moves to strengthen his power come at a perilous time. Interregional 
tensions in Tajikistan, which may have existed to some extent prior to the civil war, have 
been greatly exacerbated in its aftermath. In the eastern region of Badakhshon, the civil 
war is remembered by many as a genocide, (22) and trust in the permanence of 
Tajikistan’s peace is low. In Leninobod, resentment against the newfound power of the 
Kulobis is still strong, and has led to confrontations on more than one occasion, 
including an attempted assassination of Rahmonov in 1997. And Kulob itself, which 
supplied the bulk of the forces that put Rahmonov into power in the first place, remains 
mired in desperate poverty while a select few from the region enjoy tremendous wealth 
and power.
Throughout the country, corruption, cronyism and nepotism are rife at all levels of 
government, as well as in the education system. Rampant unemployment causes 
hundreds of thousands of Tajiks to travel to Russia every year for seasonal 
employment, mostly in such areas as construction. While Tajik migrant labor provides a 
valuable source of revenue and may serve as a useful "safety valve" to prevent unrest 
in the country, Russia has often threatened to crack down on migration, (23) which 
could have disastrous economic and social consequences for Tajikistan. Desperation 
has caused many to become involved in Tajikistan’s rapidly growing drug trade. (24)
Rahmonov’s government has adopted as its chief ideology the concept of "national 
unity" (vahdati milli), which seems to rest heavily on the promotion of certain cultural 
and historical symbols as a way of reminding (or perhaps persuading) Tajiks that they 
share a common national identity. Time, of course, will tell how effective this approach 
is, yet there are reasons to be concerned. When the Tajik civil war broke out, the worst 
violence occurred between Tajiks — that is, individuals who might very well have been 
cognizant of a shared culture, territory and language; these elements, however, 
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obviously were of far less importance than (real or assumed) political and ideological 
allegiances.
If the goal of national unity is real, it seems that the government of Tajikistan might 
reach it better through such measures as strengthening civil society, fostering economic 
growth and transparency in government, combatting corruption, and, most crucially, 
instituting a government that is responsive to the needs of its citizens, regardless of 
their regional or ethnic origin.
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